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I. Introduction
In order to further the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA)
mission of assur[ing] that the products it regulates are safe and truthfully la-
beled,1 the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) gives FDA the
power to enforce prohibitions on labeling that causes a food, drug, cosmetic, or
medical device to be misbranded.2 The FD&C Act denes labeling as all labels
and other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of
its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.3 Because of the
expansive nature of this denition, independently written pamphlets, newspa-
pers, and books that accompany products covered by the FD&C Act constitute
labeling in certain circumstances. This exacerbates the tension between the
First Amendment's free speech guarantee and FDA's mandate, and raises the
question of how courts should scrutinize FDA's ability to seize or enjoin the sale
of misleading labeling.4 The importance of both the Free Speech Clause and
the protection of consumers makes this a dicult issue to resolve, and as of yet,
1PETER BARTONHUTT& RICHARDA. MERRILL, FOODA2~DDRUGLAM 5 (2d ed.
1991).
2Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Hereinafter ~~&c Act), SS3O1(a), 301(g), 301(k)
(1938).
3Id. at S201(m).
4This paper will focus exclusively on the type of labeling that falls within the second clause
of the denition, since the categorization of independent written matter as labeling emphasizes
the First Amendment issue.
1no case has squarely confronted the issue.5
The analysis of constitutional limitations on FDA's anti-misbranding
powers turns on how the Supreme Court would classify labeling: is it a distinct
category of regulated speech, commercial speech, or ordinary speech? FDA
has advocated the classication of labeling as a distinct category of regulated
speech, but there is little authority or logic to support this position, and the
First Amendment tradeo of such a classication would be too great. The ev-
idence suggests that the Court would almost denitely deal with labeling as
commercial speech, but should instead treat it as ordinary speech. By treating
labeling as ordinary speech, the Court can circumvent the myriad inrmities of
the commercial speech doctrine, while providing an acceptable balance between
the First Amendment and consumer protection.
II. The Scope of Labeling
In order to keep the proverbial horse before the cart, it is necessary
to establish exactly what speech is at issue before considering what level of
protection the Supreme Court should aord it. The Wheeler-Lea Act of 19386
gave the Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction over the advertising of food,
drugs, devices, and cosmetics, while FDA retained power to regulate the labeling
of these items.7 Thus, the threshold inquiry in an apparent misbranding case is
whether the written matter at issue is advertising or labeling.
5HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 49.
652 Stat. 111, 114 (1938). The Wheeler-Lea Act was later incorporated into 15 U.S.C.
SS52 o58.
7Congress subsequently granted FDA the power to regulate advertising for prescription
drugs, FD&C Act, S502(n); and vitamins and minerals, Id. at SS403(a)(2), 707.
2The statutory denition of labeling quoted in the introduction8 is
amazingly broad and exible, and can include virtually anything that accom-
panies a food, drug, device, or cosmetic. This exibility is enhanced by the
fact that courts construe the FD&C Act liberally when determining whether
something constitutes labeling: since the Act is designecL to prevent injury to
the public health, the rule of strict construction does not apply.9 To most peo-
ple, it is probably counterintuitive to consider books written by independent
authors as labeling, but the connection becomes more apparent if one imagines
the following scenario. On the shelves of a health food store, jars of honey are
surrounded by About Honey, a booklet written by an author who has no connec-
tion to the store or the honey manufacturer. In addition, copies of a newsletter
containing an article entitled Eat Honey and Increase Your Vitality are on the
store premises. When a prospective customer asks for information about honey,
a store employee shows him the book and the pamphlet. The literature contains
unsubstantiated claims that herald honey as a panacea for various diseases and
ailments that have plagued man from time immemorial.10
This very fact pattern was at issue in United States v. 250 Jars
'Cal's Tupelo Blossom U.S. Fancy Pure Honey'.11 In upholding the District
Court's determination that the literature in question constituted labeling, the
Sixth Circuit reasoned that the FD&C Act was passed to protect unwary cus-
8See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9United States v. Research Laboratories, 126 F.2d 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1942). See also United
States v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355. 358 (1948) (The problem is a practical one of consumer
protection, not dialectics).
10United States v. 250 Jars 'Cal's Tupelo Blossom U.S. Fancy Pure Honey', 344 F.2d 288,
289 (6th Cir. 1965).
11Id.
3tomers in vital matters of health and, consequently, must be given a liberal
construction to eectuate this high purpose.12 Failing to take action against
this book and newsletter duo would be tantamount to open[ing] a loophole
through which those who prey upon the weakness, gullibility, and superstition
of human nature can escape the consequences of their actions.13
A more coordinated use of a book as labeling was at issue in United
States v. 8 Cartons 'Plantation 'The Original' etc. Molasses'.14 In this case,
copies of a book touting alleged benets of blackstrap molasses were placed in
a health food store window along with several jars of the molasses. The display
further featured a sign that informed potential customers that they could order
all products for the Hauser diet and purchase blackstrap molasses from the store,
and should Come in for full information.15 In response to inquiries, the store
handed customers a copy of the book and referred them to the pages therein
that discussed blackstrap molasses. Given this overwhelming evidence of the
store's use of the book to sell molasses, the court had no diculty in concluding
that the book constituted labeling.'16
As the Cal's Honey and Plantation Molasses cases and the FD&C
Act denition indicate, the determining factor in whether to classify written
matter as labeling is whether it accompanies the article it describes. In Kordel
v. United States,'17 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the phrase 'accompanying
12Id.
13Id.
14103 F.Supp 626 (W.D.N.Y. 1951).
15Id. at 627.
16See Id. at 628.
17335 U.S. 345 (1948).
4such article' is not restricted to labels that are on or in the article or package
that is transported.'18 Instead, the Court took the view that it is the textual
relationship between the written matter and the product that is important: one
thing accompanies another when it supplements or explains jt.19
If labeling is not restricted to the writing that is physically attached
to a product's container,20 what are its limits? Clearly, There is a line to be
drawn, and labeling cannot include every writing which bears some relation
to the product.21 In United States v. 24 Bottles 'Sterling Vinegar and Honey,'
Etc.,22 although a store sold Vinegar and Honey mixtures and two books making
bold claims about such mixtures, the Second Circuit held that the books did
not constitute labeling, since there was no evidence of any joint promotion of
either book with Vinegar and Honey.23 While the books undoubtedly helped
18Id. at 349. See also V.E. Irons, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 1957)
('labeling' must be given a broad meaning to include all literature used in the sale of food and
drugs, whether or not it is shipped into interstate commerce along with the article); United
States v. 7 Jugs, etc. 'Dr. Salsbury's Rakos', 53 F.Supp. 746, 755 (D.Minn. 1944)
(The mere fact that the products were shipped at a dierent time, over a dierent route and
were received at a dierent time from the booklets should not be permitted to confuse or
obscure the substance of the matter).
19335 U.S. at 350. The Third Circuit has gone even farther, holding that, if the literature
is obviously printed for use generally in promoting the sale of the [product], there is no
requirement that the literature actually had been used as labeling, i.e., that it had been used
in connection with selling the product. United States v. 47 Bottles 'Jenasol RJ Formula '60",
320 F.2d 564, 569 (3rd Cir. 1963).
20In Nature Food Centres v. United States, 310 F.2d 67 (1st Cir. 1962), the appellant
turned the tables, and claimed that independent leaets satised the FD&C Act's armative
branding requirements for various dietary supplements sold in their stores. The court rejected
this argument, since the leaets were only available for a fee at various nutrition lectures, and
were not available at the stores: although by'accompanying' documents a defendant may incur
liability for false labeling even though they do not accompany all the products, this does not
mean that independent documents can satisfy armative labeling obligations with respect
to those products they do not accompany. Id. at 70 o71. See also Alberty Food Products
Co. v. United States, 194 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1952) (It is not sucient that the labeling
contain a minimum of information and the use of the drug be induced by elaborate collateral
representations. To permit the operation of such an escape valve would render the aims and
purposes of labeling requirements nugatory).
21United States v. 24 Bottles 'Sterling vinegar and Honey,' Etc., 338 F.2d 157, 158 (2nd
Cir. 1964).
22Id.
23Id. at 159.
5the store to sell the product, they were in the literature section of the store,
no displays featured both the books and the product, and the store sold one
of the books for two years prior to carrying the product. Thus, although the
books made unsubstantiated claims, the claims were not made in immediate
connection with the sale of the product.24 As a result, there was no violation
of the FD&C Act, which was not intended to deal generally with misleading
claims.25
The vague language of the FD&C Act can clearly lead to fact-
specic battles over whether a particular book labels a product. Assuming that
a book does constitute labeling, it misbrands the accompanying product if it
is false or misleading in any particular.26 As with labeling, statutory language
that is both broad in scope and short on details is likely to generate heated
debate over whether information is misleading. The delivery of a misbranded
food, drug, device, or cosmetic for introduction into27 interstate commerce, or
the misbranding of such an item during28 or after29 interstate commerce, and
the receipt30 in interstate commerce of a misbranded item are all prohibited by
the FD&C Act. When such violations occur, FDA is empowered to undertake
injunction proceedings31 and seize32 the misbranded items. Further elaboration
24Id. at 160.
25Id.
26The FD&c Act contains identical language in the provisions dealing with misbranded food
(S403(a)); drugs and devices (S502(a)); and cosmetics (S602(a)). The statute also provides
long lists of specic ways in which labeling can misbrand products.
27FD&C Act S301(a).
28Id. at S301(b).
29Id. at S301(k).
30Id. at S301(c).
31Id. at S302.
32Id. at S304.
6on the intricacies of classifying books as labeling and/or misleading is beyond
the scope of this paper; now, the discussion turns to where on the spectrum of
speech the Supreme Court might place labeling.
III.Labeling and the First Amendment's Protection of SDeech
What are the implications of the First Amendment's free speech
protections for FDA's powerful anti-misbranding weapons? Given the fairly
broad statutory language, FDA's signicant power, and the sensitive nature
of limitations on speech, it is surprising that no case has squarely confronted
the issue33 of constitutional limitations on FDA's ability to restrict the sale of
independently written books used as labeling.34 It is clear that at some point,
the First Amendment's protection of free speech limits the power of government
to regulate the content of labeling for food and similar products; the diculty
is in dening this limitation.35
The Supreme Court has constructed a tiered system of speech,
deeming some forms of speech more worthy of protection than others. Thus,
the limits placed on FDA's regulatory power will be a function of the category
of speech in which the Court places labeling. Judging from precedents in analo-
gous areas, this would most likely be one of three categories: a distinct category
33HU'r'r & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 49.
34The fact that there has been no direct confrontation is due in part to the revision of
FDA policy in 1982. Although it still seizes labeling other than books, FDA no longer seizes
books along with misbranded products; instead, when a book misbrands a product, FDA
will consider ling.., an injunction to halt, after a hearing, the misuse of the book. FDA
Compliance Policy Guide 7153.13 (Issued Dec. 1, 1932; Revised Aug. 31, 1989). FDA
apparently changed its policy in response to the fear that it would be vulnerable to attack
on First Amendment grounds. See United States v. An Article of Drug on the Premises of
DMSO, Inc., 1983 o1984 FDLI Jud. Rec. 1 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). Of course, FDA may at any
time change its view on how it should pursue books, and this paper will occasionally use the
term book as a generic term for independent written matter.
35nu'rT & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 49.
7of regulated speech, commercial speech, or pure speech.
A.A Distinct Cateqorv of Recmlated Sueech
FDA, like any other governmental agency, would love to be able
to regulate as it sees t without having to deal with uncertain and unpleasant
limitations on its power. Thus, starting with the modest premise that regula-
tion of food labeling would be impossible if the Government could not restrict
speech,36 FDA reached the bold conclusion that its restrictions on food labeling
should be subject to the minimal scrutiny that is aorded to the government
in certain heavily-regulated areas. The proposed similarity between food label-
ing and securities, labor, and antitrust regulation is that in each instance, the
Government exerts extensive regulatory authority over the surrounding activity
and may place restrictions on speech that bear directly on the Government's ob-
jectives.37 In other words, since FDA's power to regulate food labeling derives
from its broad powers over food, FDA contends that these regulations should
be subject to the limited scrutiny that has been aorded restrictions on speech
under extensive regulatory schemes involving areas of economic activity.38
There are several problems with FDA's contention that labeling
should be treated as a distinct category of regulated speech. First, the only
case that FDA legitimately cites to support its contention is SEC v. Wall
3658 Fed. Reg. 2478, 2525 (Jan. 6, 1993).
37Edward Dunkelberger & Sarah E. Taylor, The NLRA, Health Claims, and the First
Amendment, 48 Fooo& DRUGL.J. 631, III B (1993). N.E.: Publication page references for
this article are not available on Westlaw, and the volume of the journal in which it was printed
could not be located in the Harvard Law School library during the weeks of 1/16/95 and
1/23/95, despite the placement of a search request at the Circulation Desk. Thus, references
for this article will be to section numbers, not page numbers.
3858 Fed. Reg. at 2527.
8Street Publishing Institute,39 a Court of Appeals case which upheld the right
of the government to regulate a stock market magazine. Several factors render
this case inapposite to food labeling. The Wall Street court emphasized that
speech relating to the purchase and sale of securities.., forms a distinct category
of communications, since usecurities regulation is a form of regulation distinct
from the more general category of commercial speech.40 Nowhere in the course
of highlighting the unique nature of the stock market does the court refer to
labeling. In addition, the issue at bar was not a restriction on speech, but
rather a regulation that required the magazine to disclose that it had been
paid to publish certain articles. Furthermore, other than the fact that the
government regulates both areas, there is little similarity between food labeling
and the stock market, and there is no logical reason why rules applying to one
necessarily apply to the other. This does not bode well for FDA's position,
since the Supreme Court has been hesitant to transfer narrowly-dened First
Amendment restrictions to new contexts 41
Another problem with FDA's contention is that FDA did not jus-
tify its need to be able to regulate labeling with only limited scrutiny, i.e., it
never asserted why treating labeling as ordinary speech or commercial speech
39851 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989). FDA implicated only
one other case that was decided after Central Hudson(see infra note 6?): Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). which is inapposite. See Dunkelberger
& Taylor, supra note 37, at III B.
40851 F.2d at 373.
41See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 365 (1977) (The Court, in dealing
with restrictions on lawyer advertising, was wary of applying its decision to other contexts:
Because of the possibility... that the dierences among professions might bring dierent con-
stitutional considerations into play, we specically reserved judgment as to other professions.
In fact, even within the profession of lawyering, the Court restricted its decision to advertis-
ing for price and type of services, not delving into advertising claims of the quality of legal
services).
9would hamper its eorts to prevent misbranding. Clearly, it must be able to
restrict what is said in labeling so that it can protect the public. But why
give the surgeon a chainsaw when a scalpel will do? In the case of labeling,
the scalpel (more ne-tuned power to regulate speech) is powerful enough to do
the job (as we will see later), while the chainsaw (nearly unrestricted power to
regulate speech) is too strong and may consequently suppress speech the First
Amendment should protect. If one accepts the proposition that a regulatory
agency should have only the power it needs to perform its function, especially
when important rights are at stake, it is axiomatic that it is undesirable, and
perhaps dangerous, to empower an agency to go beyond its calling.
The Wall Street case itself provides an example of the highly limited
scrutiny that regulations face when the speech involved is a category of regulated
speech. The court did[N]ot think it necessary... to inquire, as we would if only
commercial speech were involved, whether the government's specic regulatory
objective.., is constitutionally permissible. In areas of extensive regulation  o like
securities dealing  o we do not believe the Constitution requires the judiciary
to weigh the relative merits of particular regulatory objectives that impinge
upon communications occurring within the umbrella of an overall regulatory
scheme.42
This reasoning, when applied to books used as labeling, could en-
danger speech that should be protected. For example, if FDA decided to expand
signicantly its interpretation of what constitutes labeling, a court employing
42851 F.2d at 373.
10the above reasoning would be unlikely to second-guess it, and would leave far
more books subject to FDA censorship without adequately considering the coun-
tervailing First Amendment considerations. Likewise, FDA could run roughshod
over books by construing misleading in any particular in a way that would impli-
cate every book that was not comprehensive, easy to understand, fully balanced,
and supported by signicant scientic data. Should a diet book that labels food
be seized if it does not compare the program it advocates with others, or if it
claims its plan is an excellent way to trim down, without dening excellent in
detail? If the Supreme Court were to analyze restrictions on food labeling as
a category of regulated speech, courts would not consider the relative merits of
particular regulatory objectives,43 and FDA could remove dozens of books from
store shelves.44
While deep down FDA does not consider it necessary for its First
Amendment analysis to determine whether or not food labeling ts the def-
inition of commercial speech, it has reluctantly recognized that no court has
supported its position, and at least one court has categorized labeling as com-
mercial speech.45 Because of this, and the diculties of supporting its preferred
position, FDA gave up its unconvincing attempt to classify food labeling as a
distinct category of regulated speech, and currently justies its restrictions on
labeling by relying upon the Supreme Court's framework for commercial speech
43Id.
44Even if the books were mostly useless, such action would seriously restrict our paradigm
of a marketplace of ideas, in which ideas succeed or fail on their merits, not by government
at.
4558 Fed. Reg. at 2525 o2526.
11cases.46
B Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court dened commercial speech in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.47 as speech
which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction.'48 Commercial
speech is currently a middle ground between speech in an extensive regulatory
scheme and ordinary noncommercial speech, but this has not always been the
case. Until the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court assumed that most types of
commercial speech  o commercial advertising, or speech that merely proposes a
commercial transaction  o fell wholly outside the First Amendment.49 In Valen-
tine v. Chrestensen,50 the grandfather of the commercial speech doctrine, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated that the Constitution imposes no... restraint on
government as respects purely commercial speech.51 Thus, in Eight Cartons
'Plantation etc. tlolasses',52 decided in the Valentine era, the First Amend-
46See Dunkelberger & Taylor, supra note 37, at III B.
47425 U.S. 748 (1976). See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
66 o67 (1983), in which the Court held that the fact that pamphlets sent through the mail
were conceded to be advertisements clearly does not compel the conclusion that they are
commercial speech, even though the pamphlets referred to a specic product. Likewise, the
fact that Youngs mailed the pamphlets for economically-motivated reasons would clearly be
insucient by itself to turn the materials into commercial speech. However, the Court held
that the combination of these characteristics provided strong support for the District Court's
conclusion that the pamphlets should be characterized as commercial speech.
48Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations
Com'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
49GERALD GUNTHER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTI~AL LAw 838 (5th Edi-
tion1992).
50316 U.S. 52 (1942). At issue in Valentine was a New York statute that limited the
distribution of any handbill, circular card, booklet [or] placard that qualied as commercial
[or] business advertising matter. Id. at 53, n. 1.
51Id. at 54. Of course, this did not mean that the First Amendment did not apply simply
because the speaker had a commercial motive: the fact that a movie or book is distributed
for prot does not mean the First Amendment does not apply. See GUNTHER, supra note
49, at 839.
52 103 F.Supp. 626 (W.D.N.Y. 1951).
12ment concerns of a book publisher were easily dismissed, since the seizure of its
books had not interfered with [their] bona de sale, i.e., the books were part
of a distribution plan to sell molasses, a use tantamount to purely commercial
advertising.53
In the early 1970s, the Court actively used the Valentine doctrine.
Initially, the policy was strengthened in cases such as Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Human Relations Commission,54 in which the Court upheld a law that prohib-
ited the use of certain classic examples of commercial speech.55 However, the
Court changed its path in Virginia Phannacy,56 in which it invalidated a statute
that banned advertising of prescription drug prices as violative of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Court abandoned the Valentine doctrine of com-
mercial speech for a middle-of-the oroad approach: commercial speech no longer
lacks all protection,57 but there are two types of permissible regulations on it:
content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, and manner of the speech;58 and
the attempt to insure that the stream of commercial information ows cleanly
as well as freely.59 As for the latter type of regulation, the Court admitted
that diculties will arise, since much commercial speech is not provably false,
or even wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading.60
53Id.
54413 U.S. 376 (1973).
55Id. at 385.
56425 U.S. at 748. See also Bigelow v. virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
57425 U.S. at 762.
58FDA misbranding provisions are content-based, so they are not time, place, or manner
restrictions. See, e.g., Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94
(1977) (A town proscribed the placement of For Sale signs on residential property, based on
the fear that the content of such signs would cause other residents to sell their houses. Thus,
even though the statute outlawed only one kind of communication, it was not merely a time,
place, or manner restriction).
59425 U.S. at 771.
60Id. See also Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84 (Two clearly permissible limitations on commercial
13Why is commercial speech not worthy of the full protections af-
forded to noncommercial speech? In National Commission on Egg Nutrition v.
Federal Trade Commission,61 ' the Seventh Circuit reasoned that, in a com-
mercial context, the First Amendment interests of the manufacturer and the
consumer are often at odds, and must be balanced. The interest of the con-
sumer in obtaining truthful information about the product is served by insuring
that the information is not false or deceptive.62 On the other hand, a regulation
prohibiting deception is not likely to impede the interests of the manufacturer
in disseminating information about its product, for two reasons. First, Since
advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech
is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.63 Second,
concerns over the chilling eect on speech of an uncertain regulation are quelled
by the fact that an advertiser presumably can determine more readily than oth-
ers whether his speech is truthful and protected.64 Hence, when the interests of
the consumers are weighed against the interests of the advertisers, the scale is
tipped in favor of regulation.65 However, it is still the case that the party seek-
ing to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying
speech are restrictions on advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading, and restrictions
on the time, place, and manner of advertising).
61570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977).
62Id. at 162.
63Bates, 433 U.S. at 382.
64Id.
65570 F.2d at 162. See also Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public
Service Com'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (Two characteristics of commercial speech
allow its content to be regulated, even though the First Amendment prohibits content-based
regulations in most contexts. First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both
the market and their products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of
their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity. Second, commercial speech, the
ospring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not 'particularly
susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation').
14it.66
In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion of New York,67 the U.S. Supreme Court consolidated its commercial speech
jurisprudence into a four opart analysis:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next,
we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both in-
quiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation di-
rectly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.68
In Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v.Fox,69
the Court interpreted the fourth prong of the Central Hudson analysis as mean-
ing that the government need not employ the least restrictive means in regulat-
ing commercial speech, but rather one narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective.70
While uthere is no Supreme Court case squarely addressing whether
labeling is commercial speech,71 it can be argued that it is commercial speech
based on the similarities between labeling and advertising, which is the paradigm
66Youngs Drug, 463 U.S. at 70, n. 20.
67447 U.S. 557 (1980).
68Id. at 566. This analysis has been central to subsequent commercial speech cases. See,
e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490(1981); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Company of Puerto
Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
69492 U.S. 469 (1989).
70Id. at 480.
71Dunkelberger & Taylor, supra note 37, at III A.
15of commercial speech: both refer to a specic product, and... are motivated
by the economic interest of the manufacturer.72 Some courts have accepted
this analogy and have treated labeling as commercial speech,73 and the FDA
Compliance Policy Guide that deals with the seizure of books assumes without
discussion that such books constitute commercial speech.74 The combination
of these facts has led some commentators to have no doubt that the Supreme
Court would base a labeling case on the framework for analysis of governmental
restrictions on commercial speech.75
Assuming the Court does analyze labeling as commercial speech,
it would then proceed with the four-step analysis outlined in Central Hudson.
In the case of misbranding, the argument would have to focus on the issue of
whether the book qualies as misleading;76 if it does, it receives no protection at
all under the commercial speech doctrine, and FDA has free reign to prohibit it
as it pleases. If the labeling is not misleading, it could constitutionally be regu-
lated if the other three Central Hudson requirements are met.77 However, in the
72Id.
73See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. Maurer, 712 F.Supp 645 (S.D. Ohio 1989); Adolph Coors
Co. v. Bentsen, 944 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1991).
74FDA Compliance Policy Guide 7153.13 (Issued Dec. 1 1983; Revised Aug. 31, 1989).
75Dunkelberger & Taylor, supra note 37, at III B.
76Almost any writing that is not distilled to the simplest language possible, or is not com-
prehensive, can literally be misleading. See, e.g., Benecial Corporation v. FTC, 542 F.2d
611, 618 (3d Cir. 1976) (These consumers may well have been singularly dense. They were,
nevertheless, a part of the audience to which the advertisements were directed); FTC v. Ster-
ling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963), quoting 1 Caliman, Unfair Competition
and Trademarks S19.2(a)(1), at 341-44 (1950) (The general public has been dened as 'that
vast multitude which includes the ignorant, and unthinking and the credulous, who in making
purchases, do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general
impressions').
77The Court would rst ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial, and
it would be very dicult to answer this in the negative in a food labeling case. Thus, the
Court's true focus would likely be on the nal two requirements: whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest. 447 U.S. at 566. This standard is clearly stricter than
that employed in Wall Street, and a court employing it would thus be more likely to nd that
16case of misbranding, FDA currently would not have the statutory authority to
do so, since the FD&C Act's misbranding provisions apply only to labeling that
is ufalse or misleading in any particular. Thus, if the labeling is not misleading,
the rest of the Central Hudson analysis is moot in a misbranding case,78 and
treating labeling as commercial speech simply places a judicial seal of approval
on any FDA action.
If FDA and the courts do not abuse common sense in designating
labeling as misleading,79 the eects of treating labeling as commercial speech
appear to be desirable: FDA has enough power to protect consumers from devi-
ous merchants, and only fervent First Amendment zealots will decry a measure
that prevents wholesale consumer fraud. However, despite this positive result,
there is ample reason to doubt whether the Supreme Court should, or even
could, classify labeling as commercial speech, as we will see in the next section.
C. Pure SDeech
Ordinary, noncommercial speech is situated at the opposite end of
the spectrum from the distinct category of regulated speech detailed in Wall
Street. Pure speech is the kind of speech for which we presume the full weight
of First Amendment protections, and for which restrictions are presumptively
suspect unless they t certain explicit criteria.
While the Supreme Court would likely categorize labeling as com-
a regulation violated the First Amendment.
78This would not be the case only if, for some reason, the FD&C Act's misleading in any
particular is not coextensive with Central Hudson's misleading.
79The FD&C Act denes misleading in S201(n): [Tihere shall be taken into account... not
only representations made or suggested... but also the extent to which the labeling.., fails to
reveal [material] facts...
17mercial speech,80 it is important to emphasize that it is not certain that it would
do so. While the analogy between advertising and labeling remains, uthe cases
have been able to shed little light on Central Hudson, aside from standing as ad
hoc subject-specic examples of what is permissible and what is not.81 This has
led FDA to conclude that, unlike 'advertising pure and simple,' labeling does
not fall clearly within the bounds of commercial speech.82 As we will see, there
is nothing inherent in the nature of labeling that mandates its categorization as
commercial speech, and it is unclear that it is desirable to do so.
Analyzing labeling as ordinary, noncommercial speech would allow
FDA to protect consumers, while avoiding the myriad problems of the commer-
cial speech doctrine. Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner argue that the commer-
cial o noncommercial distinction makes no sense,83 an unsurprising fact consid-
ering that the Supreme Court plucked the commercial speech doctrine Out of
thin air.84 Applying Kozinski and Banner's framework of analysis to the issue of
labeling, one is led to conclude that treating labeling as ordinary speech would
be preferable to treating it as commercial speech.
1.A Second Look at Commercial Speech: Problems With Classication and Justication
As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court has dened commer-
80See supra section III B.
81Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev.
627, 631 (1990).
8258 Fed. Reg. at 2525, quoting Zauderer v. Oce of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,
637 (1985). FDA further argued, without substantiation, that labeling should certainly be
considered closer to commercial speech than to 'pure' speech. Id. See also SEC v. Wall Street
Publishing Institute, 851 F.2d 365, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (we are not convinced that the
feature articles (in a stock market magazine] under consideration here are commercial speech.
The articles are not 'conceded' to be advertisements, and in fact, are not it advertisement
format.)
83Id. at 628.
84Id.
18cial speech as that which does no more than propose a commercial transaction.85
Suppose an independent author writes The Sweet Science, a book that marvels
over a plethora of unsubstantiated powers of honey. Does this book fall un-
der the denition of commercial speech? Of course, by propose a commercial
transaction, the Court cannot mean the proposal of a transaction to purchase
the book itself, for if this were the case, every book and newspaper sold would
be commercial speech. Instead, the Court must mean that the book needs to
propose a transaction to purchase honey. One may argue that, if copies of the
aforementioned tome are placed in a supermarket's honey aisle, they propose
the following commercial transaction: Buy a jar of honey and reap the bene-
ts described in this book. But the book merely reports the author's casual
research, or general intuition, that honey will relieve what ails you; it does not
exhort a consumer to do anything.86
Even if the author of The Sweet Science secretly owns stock in a
major honey corporation, and the book is part of an avaricious subterfuge to
help him repay his law school loans, that should not result in the classication of
the book's speech as commercial, since the commercial speech distinction cannot
turn on the prot motive of the speaker; the labeling of speech as commercial
has to be the result of an examination of the speech itself, not the speaker's
85Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973). For another statement, see Thomas H. Jackson and John Calvin Jef fries, Jr., Com-
mercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1979)
('Commercial speech' refers to business advertising that does no more than solicit a commer-
cial transaction or state information relevant thereto-).
86Indeed, if the book is actually a hoax, one can imagine that the author will actually not
want people to purchase honey. This way, it will take longer for people to discover that his
claims are bogus.
19purpose.87 Otherwise, most books and newspapers, which are motivated at
least in part by prot, would be considered commercial speech, and would be
subject to its restricted protections.
Furthermore, even if one supposes that the book is explicit in urg-
ing readers to buy honey now or suer grave consequences, why would the book
suddenly not propose a commercial transaction when it no longer accompanies
honey? For example, if The Sweet Science does no more than report that the
dynamic combination of honey and cinnamon combats 27 of the most vexing
ailments known to mankind,88 and therebydoes no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction that readers buy the two nearby products, is the book more
worthy of constitutional protection if it is moved to the next aisle? Assuming it
would no longer be labeling under the FD&C Act, it would no longer be com-
mercial speech.89 It would be inconsistent and unnecessary to aord the same
book dierent levels of constitutional protection depending upon what aisle in
the supermarket it is found. Classifying labeling as a distinct category of reg-
ulated speech or as pure speech avoids this problem: no matter where in the
supermarket the books are located, regulations limiting the sale of the books
87Kozinski & Banner, supra note 81, at 640. See also Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
761 o65.
88An article in a recent issue of the wzm~ WORLD ND~ lists the following as condi-
tions treatable with a simple mixture of honey and cinnamon: arthritis, hair loss, athlete's
foot, bladder infections, toothache, canker sores, cholesterol, cold, infertility, upset stomach,
gas, heart disease, high blood pressure, immune system, impotence, indigestion, inuenza,
longevity, pimples, poison ivy, skin infections, weight loss, cancer, fatigue, sore feet, bad
breath, and hearing loss. Beatrice Dexter, Cinnamon and Honey, WEEKLY WORLD NEWS,
January 17, 1995, at 8-9.
89Nothing inherent about the book makes it commercial speech. If, for example, it were
placed in a bookstore that does not sell food, it could hardly be said to be proposing a
commercial transaction. If the book is advertising, it would still be commercial speech, but
would be beyond the jurisdiction of both FDA and this paper.
20would undergo the same constitutional scrutiny.90
Another problem with squeezing labeling into the denition of com-
mercial speech is the rst phrase of the Supreme Court's denition of that
category, no more. Suppose that the book under consideration also contains
signicant information on non ohoney subjects such as the importance of Kant's
philosophy and the use of correct grammar. Furthermore, suppose that the au-
thor ingeniously interweaves these subjects with his theory of the goodness of
honey. The Court dealt with a similar issue in the Fox case. During a clearly
commercial Tupperware Party that violated a New York statute by taking place
in a SUNY dormitory, the salesmen discussed subjects such as how to be nan-
cially responsible and how to run an ecient home.91 The Court held that the
speech was still commercial, since the commercial and noncommercial aspects
were not inextricably intertwined: No law of man or of nature makes it im-
possible to sell housewares without teaching home economics, or to teach home
economics without selling housewares.92
The Court dismisses the issue with such ease in part because of its
selective reading: in citing the standard Virginia Pharmacy denition of com-
mercial speech, the Fox Court slyly omits the phrase no more than,93 presum-
ably to avoid the heart of the matter, which is that the doctrine of commercial
speech rests on a clean distinction between the market for ideas and the market
90Of course, since FDA pursues only the written material that is considered labeling,
whether a misleading book accompanies the article it labels will still have an eect on FDA's
decision to take action against it. However, the dierent treatment the books receive will be a
matter of FDA policy, not a constitutional matter of the level of protection the speech should
receive.
91492 U.S. at 474.
92Id.
93Id. at 473.
21for goods and services.94 In practice, this clean distinction is often illusory,
especially when books are at issue: it is rare for an entire book to have nothing
more to say than Buy honey. Thus, the classication of labeling as commercial
speech would require the Court to dilute the commercial speech doctrine by
engaging in Fox-like backpedaling.95
Not only are there signicant problems in dening labeling as com-
mercial speech, but the two justications for aording commercial speech less
protection than noncommercial speech96 do not apply well to labeling. The rst
justication is that the truth of commercial speech is more objective, and thus
easier to ascertain, than noncommercial speech. But what about a book's claim
that the power of honey is such that for years, arthritis suerers have eased their
pain with two teaspoons of honey per day? Is there an adequate way to verify
this? Even if scientists did determine that nothing in the chemical composition
of honey causes it to soothe pain, that would not be the end of the inquiry, since
honey may have a powerful placebo eect. One can think of dozens of similar
examples of statements that are dicult to verify. Thus, the determination of
whether the claims of a book used as labeling are truthful can often be highly
contestable.
In addition, every day we see false or misleading speech that is
at least as veriable as the above example: supermarket tabloid gossip and
94Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jef fries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 2(1979).
95In his Central Hudson concurrence, Justice Stevens warned that it is important that
the commercial speech doctrine not be dened too broadly lest speech deserving of greater
constitutional protection be inadvertently suppressed. 447 U.S. at 579.
96See supra section III B.
22horoscopes are two common examples. Yet these forms of speech do not receive
less protection than ordinary speech. We also see examples of speech that
is paradigmatically objective, but receives full First Amendment protection: a
person engaged in scientic speech can claim anything he wants about the eects
of honey, without governmental intrusion.97
Even if we were to grant that the claims in books used as labeling
are objectively veriable, it is unclear why that should result in less protection
for such speech. Consumers are far less likely to be misled about matters they
can check out by reference to objective facts than about such intangibles as the
leadership qualities of a political candidate...98 If an author's remedy proves
to be ineective, word will spread, and not many consumers will purchase his
book, or the honey it eulogizes. The unfortunate people who have used the
honey without benet will discontinue their therapy and hopefully will be more
wary next time.
The Supreme Court's second justication for treating commercial
speech dierently is that, since it is engaged in for prot, it is more durable and
less likely to be chilled. But, if books making health claims are big business,
then so are newspapers and movies,99 but these are not treated as commercial
speech. In addition, economic motivation is not the only strong interest behind
speech, and there is no evidence that money is a more steady anchor for speech
than religious or artistic concerns.100
97See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 81, at 635.
98Id. at 636 o637.
99See id. at 637.
100See Id.
232.Ramications of Treating Labeling as Ordinary SDeech
An initial reaction to the proposal that courts should treat labeling
as ordinary speech might be that this would hamper FDA's ability to protect
consumers, especially relative to classifying labeling in one of the two categories
previously discussed. Will books that misbrand food be entitled to the same
protection as Popeye cartoons that make outrageous claims about the power
of spinach? Thankfully, no. If we treat labeling as ordinary speech, we fall
back on [the] standard101 analysis espoused in United States v. O'Brien:102 [A]
government regulation is suciently justied if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.103
In O'Brien, the Court applied this framework to determine that a
law prohibiting the knowing mutilation of Selective Service certicates did not
abridge freedom of speech.'104 While the facts of O'Brien do not resemble those
of food labeling cases, the O'Brien test has gained immeasurable signicance
by inuencing the resolution of rst amendment problems reaching far beyond
[its] original context.105 The O'Brien framework has found use in balancing
incidental restrictions of expression... content oneutral restrictions of fully pro-
101Kozinski & Banner, supra note 81, at 651.
102391 U.S. 367 (1968).
103Id. at 377.
104Id.
105Keith Werhan, The O'Briening of Free Speech Methodology, 19 Ariz. St. L.J. 635, 637
(1987).
24tected expression... content-based restrictions of commercial speech... [and has]
appeared increasingly as a framework for addressing other discrete rst amend-
ment problems arising in a variety of settings.106 For example, in Procunier
v. Martinez,107 the Court used the analysis in deciding a case in which pris-
oners challenged regulations that allowed for the censorship of their mail. The
Court determined that O'Brien was generally analogous to the issue at bar
in Procunier, since in broader terms, both cases involved restrictions on First
Amendment liberties by governmental action in furtherance of legitimate and
substantial state interests other than suppression of expression.108 The O'Brien
analysis has also been used in contexts as diverse as a challenge to a govern-
mental passive enforcement policy,109 and restrictions placed on broadcasters
by the Public Broadcasting Act.110
This presence of O'Brien balancing across a considerable landscape
of free speech issues111 demonstrates that treating labeling as noncommercial
speech, despite dire predictions from some quarters, will not give free reign to
unscrupulous salesmen.112 FDA could easily justify the use of the misbranding
provisions of the FD&C Act against books with an O'Brien-like analysis: pre-
venting the misbranding of food furthers an important governmental interest,
which is related to Americans' physical and nancial well-being, not suppres-
sion of free expression. The restriction is no greater than necessary, since it
106Id.
107416 U.S. 396 (1974).
108Id. at 411 o412.
109Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 o614 (1985).
110FCC v. League of Women voters of California, 468 U.s. 364, 378 o384(1984).
111Werhan, supra note 105, at 638.
112Rozinski & Banner, supra note 81, at 651.
25applies only to labeling, which means simply that the book cannot accompany
the food it misleadingly touts. If, however, FDA's interpretation of the terms
misleading or labeling were to expand, the Court could overturn FDA's decision
to seize a book if the seizure was too attenuated to further an important gov-
ernmental interest, or the restriction was greater than necessary. Thus, First
Amendment concerns receive substantial protection under O'Brien, while FDA
can adequately protect consumers.
In addition, the treatment of labeling as ordinary speech ts nicely
into the widely held paradigm of when regulation is desirable: in general, the
market should be left to itself, but when there is a market failure, it is legiti-
mate to regulate. In the marketplace of labeling, preventing the ineciency of
consumer misinformation, i.e., misbranding, allows things to run more smoothly.
IV. Conclusion
The use of books with misleading claims as labeling ourishes in
food and drug stores today, as a casual glance around such establishments will
demonstrate. It is important for FDA to have eective means to enforce its
mandate prohibiting misbranding, so that it can protect consumers who are
credulous or desperate. However, it is also important to acknowledge the pri-
macy of freedom of speech in our society, and the fact that, for any regulation
on misbranding to be truly legitimate, it must account for the important First
Amendment concerns that are implicated. Despite FDA's attempts at analogiz-
ing food labeling to the stock market, there is no convincing reason to classify
food labeling as a distinct category of regulated speech. If we want to ensure
26that First Amendment rights are not encroached, it is dangerous to grant the
government power to regulate speech with only minimal scrutiny when this is
not absolutely necessary. There is a stronger, but still not convincing reason
to categorize labeling as commercial speech. Placing labeling squarely into the
denition of commercial speech requires mental gymnastics, and the justica-
tions for commercial speech do not stand up to analysis when applied in the
context of labeling. Finally, the treatment of labeling as ordinary speech al-
lows FDA to enforce its mandate to prevent misbranding, without threatening
over oregulation or relying on an ill-tting doctrine. The importance of classify-
ing labeling is a result of the tension between the two strong interests present,
and the balancing test of O'Brien is a workable compromise, steering a middle
course between the leanings for and against protection.113
113Werhan, supra note 105, at 671.
27